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Does Employee Ownership Increase Innovation?

Robert P. Garrett
ne way that firms attempt to innovate is through
investment in R&D activity. However, there is much
heterogeneity in innovations among firms making
comparable R&D investments. This article explores employee ownership’s moderating effect on the relationship
between R&D intensity and innovative output. The basis
for the moderation is that ownership increases motivation
and commitment to the innovation agenda of the company, and retains employees’ entrepreneurial efforts for internal opportunities. Using hierarchical regression, the data
support the hypothesis that employee stock ownership positively moderates the relationship between R&D intensity
and innovative output. Implications for future research
and practice are addressed.
Keywords: innovation, employee ownership, corporate entrepreneurship

O

Innovation is the primary instrument of competition for
many firms (Baumol, 2002), and is of central importance to
entrepreneurship (Covin and Miles, 1999). Zaltman, Duncan,
and Holbeck (1973) defined innovation as “an idea, practice,
or material artifact perceived as new by the relevant unit of
adoption,” and in the context of corporate entrepreneurship,
or “intrapreneurship” (Pinchot, 1985), the relevant unit of
adoption is the corporation. Schumpeter (1934) places the
entrepreneur at the center of “creative destruction,” a process
wherein radical innovation changes industrial dynamics.
Modern researchers continue to accept Schumpeter’s identification of entrepreneurship with innovation (Stopford and
Baden-Fuller, 1994). Indeed, innovativeness has become widely accepted as a primary characteristic of a firm’s “entrepreneurial posture” (Covin and Slevin, 1986; 1991).
Corporate entrepreneurship is an important subfield in
entrepreneurship (Schildt, Maula, and Keil, 2005). It is
increasingly recognized that entrepreneurial activities are
not exclusively the domain of small firms and start-ups, but
that larger, more established corporations can also be entrepreneurial (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). The entrepreneurial
activities of corporations have variously been referred to as
corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983; Zahra, 1993),
corporate venturing (Biggadike, 1979), intrapreneuring

(Pinchot, 1985), internal corporate entrepreneurship (Jones
and Butler, 1992), internal entrepreneurship (Schollhammer,
1982; Vesper, 1984), strategic renewal (Guth and Ginsberg,
1990), and venturing (Hornsby et al., 1993). While each of
these manifestations of corporate entrepreneurship have
their differences (e.g., corporate ventures result in the establishment of new organizational units for the firm, while
strategic renewal does not [Sharma and Chrisman, 1999]),
the common element among them all is innovation (Sharma
and Chrisman, 1999).
A firm’s ability to innovate is becoming increasingly
important. Two factors causing this increase in importance
are the technological revolution and greater competition in
international markets (Lei, Hitt, and Bettis, 1996). Rapid
change is part of the new competitive landscape, and many
firms are turning to innovation for new value creation (Bettis
and Hitt, 1995; Lei et al., 1996). Even in more stable environments, firms use innovation as a way to increase stagnant
returns, frequently at the expense of less innovative firms
(Utterback, 1994).
One way that firms attempt to innovate is through investment in R&D activity. Greve (2003: 687) asserts that R&D is
“the organizational process most directly involved with innovations.” By directing resources to R&D activities, firms are
attempting to produce new products or processes that will
create or enhance a firm’s competitive advantage. However,
this attempt at innovating is not analogous with the actual
production of innovation,and there still remains much heterogeneity in the number of innovations produced by similar
firms with comparable R&D expenditures. Recent scholarly
work examines this heterogeneity by examining moderators
on the relationship between R&D activity and innovation
such as firm financing structures (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009),
external markets (Tishler and Milstein, 2009), and internal
capabilities and external partnerships (Su, Tsang, and Peng,
2009). However, there is a paucity of research investigating
employee ownership plans as a determinant of innovation.
The extant research on employee ownership predominantly focuses on corporate control mechanisms (e.g., French,
1987), firm performance (e.g.,Trebucq, 2004), and monitoring
by outside blockholders (e.g., Park and Song, 1995). While
these are important outcomes for firms, and are frequently
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studied by scholars in the field of strategic management, more
conceptually proximate variables to employee ownership
regarding entrepreneurship and innovation are left underexplored in the “black box” or previous research on the topic.
Indeed, the work of Gamble (2000) looks inside the black box
to explore managerial commitment to innovation dependent
on Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) concentration, and
Long (1980) investigates how job attitudes change under
employee ownership, but any link between employee ownership and increases in innovation has been left unexplored.
Such a link, if it exists, would be conceptually interesting to
researchers investigating HRM systems and corporate entrepreneurship as well as practically interesting to firm managers
seeking to maximize their R&D investments.
This article explores employee ownership as a moderator
of the relationship between R&D expenses and innovativeness in an attempt to explain some of the aforementioned
heterogeneity. Employee ownership, measured by profit sharing and ESOPs, has been investigated by researchers considering how to create an “entrepreneurial spirit” within a company (Denton, 1993). This “spirit” is a sense that employees
are working for themselves instead of for somebody else.
When employees feel they have a stake in the business, they
are more likely to have an entrepreneurial spirit and the
sense that they can directly affect the success of the business
(Denton, 1993).
Thus, firms use employee ownership as one mechanism to
increase employee commitment to the firm. To the extent
that employees become owners of the company, and their
own personal financial performance becomes tied to the
financial performance of the company, they become more
committed to being productive workers within the company.
Previous research has identified individual-level commitment
as an important factor in R&D effectiveness (van der Bij,
Song, and Weggeman, 2003). As individual commitment
increases, R&D effectiveness also increases.
Additionally, this article proposes that stock ownership
also serves as a substitute for the potentially large gains that
may come from independent entrepreneurial ventures.
Often, the best employees within a firm recognize opportunities outside the firm to which they may be attracted, and
may desire to leave the firm to pursue those opportunities.
While risky, those opportunities have large potential payoffs.
The underlying supposition of this article is that firms use
stock ownership as a substitute for entrepreneurial rewards:
by holding ownership in the company, employees are
rewarded financially for their hard work inside the firm. They
are then less likely to engage in external entrepreneurial
activities, and more likely to keep their innovative energies
directed within the firm.
There has been much previous work examining the direct
effect of employee stock ownership on firm performance

(Park and Song, 1995;Trebucq, 2004), but there is a paucity of
research exploring the relationship of employee stock ownership with the more proximal concept of innovation. Many
of the studies on employee stock ownership focus on ESOPs
(employee stock ownership plans) as entrenchment tools
that management uses to prevent acquisition. Park and Song
(1995) were able to show positive effects of ESOPs on longterm firm performance when the ESOP functioned efficiently as a monitoring mechanism against managerial entrenchment. The current article is an effort to shorten the causal
chain by studying a variable more proximal to employee
stock ownership, namely innovation. While it is clear from
earlier studies that employee stock ownership does affect
firm performance, it is unclear how it affects firm performance. This research attempts to show that employee stock
ownership moderates the relationship between R&D intensity and number of innovations, and offers arguments of how
and why this moderating effect operates. Since previous
research has found a link between innovation and firm performance (Franko, 1989; Porter, 1990), I believe that by
demonstrating the moderation of employee ownership on
innovation, this research provides a bit more insight into the
relationship between employee ownership and firm performance.
This article proceeds as follows. First, I develop arguments
and propose hypotheses regarding the relationship between
R&D intensity and innovation, and the role of employee ownership as a moderator in this relationship. Then, I discuss the
methods of how these hypotheses were investigated. This is
followed by a presentation of the results, and finally I discuss
the conclusions of this study along with implications for
future research and practical application.

Using Employee Ownership to Explain
Innovation Differences
R&D Intensity and Innovation Production
R&D expenditures have long been recognized as an input
firms use to develop new and valuable technology resources
(Dierickz and Cool, 1989; Grabowski and Vernon, 1990). In
order to develop these technology resources, firms are often
required to make sustained investments is R&D (Vassolo,
Anand, and Folta, 2004; Ethiraj et al., 2005). Over time, firms
with greater investments in R&D should be able to accumulate more valuable technology resources, creating the means
by which further innovations can be produced. Knowledgebased resources typically develop in a path-dependent manner (Kogut and Zander, 1992), so investments made consistently over time contribute to the development of firm capabilities (Berry and Taggart, 1994; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003),
such as the innovative capability of the firm. R&D expenses
contribute to the development of technology resources within a firm, and these technology resources are used toward the
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production of innovative outcomes within the firm. Thus
framed, the argument made here is not for direct correlation
between R&D expenses and innovations. The argument recognizes that firms do not have equal capabilities (Helfat and
Peteraf, 2003), but that R&D expenditures can contribute to
building innovation capabilities, and that a main effect
between R&D expenses and innovations, though not perfectly correlated, will exist.
Hypothesis 1: The size of a firm’s financial investment
in R&D is positively related to the number of innovations produced within that firm.
As earlier discussed, similar hypotheses have been previously explored and supported, but this hypothesis is essential
to the development of the rest of this article, and so it is
included here. Employee ownership is next explored as a
moderator of the relationship between R&D intensity and
innovation.

The Moderating Effect of Employee
Ownership
There are a variety of ways in which a company can create
ownership among its employees. Among these are cooperatives where the firm is wholly owned by its employees, and
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), which are qualified retirement plans that award a fraction of firm ownership
to its employees, giving them residual claims and voting
rights (Park and Song, 1995). In addition to these more visible methods of employee ownership where the plan deals
solely in the stock of the company, there are also more diversified plans where the contributions of the employee and the
company may be directed to company stock among many
other diversified choices (e.g., 401-k’s, company savings
plans, stock bonus plans).
Employee ownership can significantly affect the relationship between employees and the organization in which they
work (Frolich et al., 1998). Long (1980: 727) suggested that
“employee ownership operates by first affecting organizational identification, viewed as three interrelated phenomena
(Patchen, 1970; Rotondi, 1975): (a) feelings of shared characteristics and common goals, (b) feelings of “belongingness” or
solidarity with the organization, and (c) support of the organization or loyalty.” The third of these phenomena is labeled
“commitment,” and is “expected to lead to various behaviors
supporting the organization, such as decreased turnover,
absenteeism, and grievances, increased willingness to innovate, and the like” (Long, 1980: 727, italics added for emphasis). From a financial perspective, employee ownership provides very real financial consequences to the employees.
Under circumstances of organizational decline or failure, the
employee owner is put in a position of risk, but the survival

and growth of the firm provide valuable financial outcomes
(Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan, 1991).These gains and losses
have an influence on the employees’ commitment to the
organization by motivating them to do what they can to
ensure the financial success of the firm. From a psychological
perspective, employee owners, as “dual” stakeholders, should
experience increased intrinsic involvement in their task due
to a greater sense of ownership (Paul, Ebadi, and Dilts, 1987;
Pierce et al., 1991).They are also more likely to identify with,
and develop a sense of belonging for, the organization (Pierce
et al., 1991). Finally, employee owners are more likely to have
positive interactions with coworkers, assist coworkers, and
function more effectively as a team because they collectively
own and control the organization (Frolich et al., 1998).This
willingness to innovate, as it develops, is not to be confused
with the ability to innovate. Willingness to innovate may
result in more innovation attempts, but only when used in
conjunction with innovation capabilities may it result in actual innovative outputs.
In addition to increased commitment, employee ownership may contribute to increased intrapreneuring (Pinchot,
1985) as a substitution for individual entrepreneurship.
Employees are becoming more knowledgeable, more educated, and more demanding of their work environment. For the
most part, these traits are very desirable in a firm’s employees, but at the same time, employees are also becoming less
loyal, more mobile, and more willing to change jobs or start
their own companies. For these highly capable employees,
there is certainly risk in undertaking an entrepreneurial
endeavor, but the pay-off is potentially unbounded. Firms use
employee stock ownership to compete with these entrepreneurial impulses of its employees. By making employees
owners, the company is building a reward system for efforts
that benefit the firm instead of the individual.Additionally, as
owners, employees perceive that they are working for themselves rather than for someone else, so they begin to feel that
they have more control over their lives and the benefits they
will receive for their hard work (Frolich et al., 1998). Thus,
the company is able to retain the most innovative people
who might otherwise be tempted to leave the firm.
Finally, employee ownership also serves as an alignment
mechanism. Employees who control large blocks of stock
may be more likely than other stockholders to influence
management for improved long-term financial performance
(French, 1987). They are in a better position than others to
monitor managerial decisions because of their proximity to
management and their familiarity with company operations
(Gamble, 2000). Perhaps most important in the context of
innovation, they have an enhanced incentive to monitor the
performance of coworkers (Bowles and Gintis, 1993). Such
monitoring is expected to reduce wasteful R&D spending.
For all these reasons, the following hypothesis is presented:

DOES EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP INCREASE INNOVATION? 39

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2010

3

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 13 [2010], No. 2, Art. 5

Hypothesis 2: Employee ownership positively moderates the effect of R&D intensity on the number of innovations produced.

Testing the Hypothesis
Sample
The sample for this study is publicly traded, high-technology
firms. High-technology firms were chosen because of the relevance of both innovation and employee ownership. First,
high-tech firms are very likely involved in producing innovations because their industry demands it in order to be competitive, profitable, or even to survive (Burgelman and
Valikangas, 2005). Second, many high-tech firms are beginning to use stock ownership plans as part of their compensation package (Pugh, Jahera, and Oswald, 2005).
A list of high-tech industries is published at the AeA website (http://www.aeanet.org/Publications/IDMK_definition.
asp). AeA’s definition of high-tech industries includes hightech manufacturing (SIC codes 357, 365, 366, 367, 381, 382,
384, and 386) and high-tech services (SIC codes 481, 482,
484, 489, and 737). COMPUSTAT was used to identify all firms
operating in high-technology manufacturing industries from
1999–2004. The search was further restricted to companies
having more than 500 employees during the time frame
selected. By selecting only firms with 500 or more employees, it was hoped that predictable (small) size-related biases
on the research variables might be avoided (e.g., smaller
firms often innovate as a niche-seeking activity to an extent
greater than larger firms [Fiegenbaum and Karnani, 1991]).
Additionally, mid-sized and larger firms were targeted for
research because prior evidence (e.g., von Hippel, 1977;
Klavans, Shanley, and Evans, 1985;Thornhill and Amit, 2001)
suggests that corporate innovation tends to be more pervasive among firms with more substantial resource bases. A
total of 263 companies were identified in COMPUSTAT that
matched the criteria for industry, time frame, and employees.
Data were collected on employee stock ownership, innovation output, and firm financial information. Availability of
these data further limited the sample because not all firms
participate in employee ownership programs, or they do not
report their participation. The 11-k filing with the SEC is the
document used to report on employee ownership plans, and
these reports include information on all plans (ESOPS, company savings plans, stock bonus plans, etc.) offered by the
company, as well as all investments made by the plans.
However, because it is impossible to distinguish between
companies not participating in ownership plans and companies that do participate but do not report it (for example,
Apple Computers reports an employee stock ownership participation on their company website, but their 11-k was not
available publicly), the hypotheses were tested only within
the group of companies for which the 11-k was available.

Measures
Dependent variable. Innovative output was measured
using patent counts for each company in the sample. This
information is available at the website of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (www.uspto.gov). Patents represent the
discovery of a product or process perceived as new by the
organization. There are potential limitations of using patent
data; namely, that it does not address the importance or radicalism of the innovation. However, a longlasting precedent
has been established in the literature for using patent information (Lei et al., 1996) as a proxy for innovation.
Because the patent approval process can often take a significant amount of time (as much as three years), and because
employee ownership in one year is unlikely to produce
patented innovations in the same year (due to the pathdependent nature of innovations), employee stock ownership data was gathered for the year 1999, and patent data was
gathered from 2003.
Independent variable. R&D intensity is measured by
R&D expenses as a percentage of sales according to Coff
(2003). The firm financial information—R&D expenses and
sales in 1999—was obtained from COMPUSTAT. The variable
of R&D intensity was lagged back to 1999 because of the
anticipated delay between investment in R&D and the actual
award of a patent. Because R&D investments lead to stocks of
knowledge that are built up over time, and because the
patent award process can take two or three years from the
date of patent application, a four-year lag (1999–2003)
seemed appropriate. As a test, additional data on the independent variable was gathered for the years 1997, 1998,
2000, and 2001. The results, discussed later in this article,
were robust across lags of varying lengths of time, though the
six-year lag yielded reduced significance of the results. The
three-year average from 1998–2000 was also used as a check
(Krishnan, Tadepalli, and Park, 2009), and the results were
also robust.
Moderator variable. Information on employee stock
ownership is available in 11-k filings with the SEC. The variable used from this information was company stock held per
employee.
Control variables. Control variables were chosen based
on their anticipated effects on both the independent and
dependent variables. By controlling for these effects, the likelihood that there exist alternative explanations for the variation in innovative output was minimized. All of the following
control variables were measured contemporaneously with
stock ownership in the year 1999: size measured by number
of employees, age, industry, total assets, and sales.

Analysis
Of the 263 companies in the sample, data on employee stock
ownership was available for 77 (29.3%). On average, the firms
in the sample had 140 patents in 2003, 18,000 employees,
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tions are between the control variables representing employees, assets, and sales. This is to be expected because they are
all, in fact, related to firm size. However, for the purposes of
this study, they are each controlling for separate effects. Even
if they do all correlate to firm size, this at least represents a
very conservative approach to the regression. Other than
these three variables, there do not appear to be additional
correlations that raise the concern of multicolinearity.
Table 2 shows the results of the hierarchical regression
analysis. As part of these regressions, multicolinearity was
checked, the residuals were analyzed, variance inflation factors were determined, and the Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation was run (D = .672, n.s.). The procedure used for
running these tests is according to Kutner et al. (2004). After
transforming the number of patents by the natural logarithm,
the results of these tests fell well within the range of acceptability, and so the analysis does not suffer from violations of
the assumptions of regression.
After the first step of including the control variables in
Model 1, I added R&D intensity to test hypothesis one (Model
2).After doing so, I found a strongly significant positive relationship with innovative output (p < .01). Also, the change in
R2 from Model 1 to Model 2 was .041 (p < .01). The strongly significant beta for R&D intensity, coupled with a significantly increased explanatory power of the model allows for
the conclusion that hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. This
is consistent with expectations based on previous studies
investigating the relationship between R&D intensity and
innovation, and is evidence that sampling only firms that
have stock ownership plans has not affected the basic relationship.
The moderator variable and the interaction term were then
added to the regression equation in Model 3. The variable for
company stock per employee was not significant, but the
interaction term with R&D intensity was (p < .05). The
change in R2 for the model was marginally significant (p < .1).

sales of $4.5B, R&D expenses of $390M, and total employee
savings plan holdings of $930M in 1999. ANOVA tests were
conducted to determine if the companies reporting employee stock holdings in 11-k forms were different from the ones
that did not file 11-k forms in the sample. There was no significant difference between the companies on R&D as a percentage of total sales. However, the companies were significantly different on number of employees and age, with the
companies providing 11-k filings being larger and older on
average than companies that did not file an 11-k.
To test the hypotheses, hierarchical regression analysis was
employed.The raw variables gathered, however, were not normally distributed,and therefore were not immediately suitable
for use in regression analysis without first transforming them.
When variables possess unequal error variances and nonnormality of the error terms, a transformation may be applied to
allow a model with an otherwise complex, curvilinear
response function to be expressed as a simple linear regression model (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter, 2004). Patents,
employees, assets, sales, R&D as a percentage of sales, and
stock ownership per employee were all transformed using
the natural logarithm—one of the transformations recommended by Kutner et al. (2004)—which resulted in a normal
distribution for all these variables. Following the guidelines of
Aiken and West (1991), the interaction terms were created by
mean-centering the original variables and then calculating the
interaction term in order to deal with potential problems of
colinearity. The VIFs (variance inflation factors) after meancentering were no greater than 1.4, which is well within the
standards of acceptability; a maximum VIF under 10 is an indication that multicollinearity is likely not unduly influencing
the least squares estimates (Kutner et al., 2004).

Results
The means, standard deviations, and correlations for the
research variables are shown in Table 1. The largest correla-

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Study Variables
Variable
1. Log patent

Mean

Std. Dev.

1

2

3

4

5

3.26

2.11

25.13

12.45

3. Log employ

1.99

1.44

.72**

.23*

4. Log assets

7.22

1.68

.78**

.18

.93*

5. Log sales

7.23

1.59

.78**

.17

.95**

.95**

6. Log RD/sales

-2.63

2.40

.30**

-.02

-.01

.14

.05

7. Log stock/emp

7.56

0.79

.38**

.15

.31*

.40**

.33

2.Age

6

.16

.20

* p < .05
** p < .01
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Table 2. Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Log of Patents
Model 1
Step 1: Controls
Industry dummy 1
.030
Industry dummy 2
.067
Age
.067
Log employees
-.435†
Log assets
.495*
Log sales
.707*

Model 2

Model 3

.015
.032
.057
-.218
.223
.753*

.035
.005
.062
-.337
.081
.987**

.223**

.214**

Step 2: Independent
Log RD/Sales

Innovative
Output
Low stock
ownership
per
employee

R&D Intensity

Step 3: Moderator
Log stock/employee

.075

Step 4: Interaction term
Stock/employee x RD/sales
Model R2
Adjusted R2
Model F

High stock
ownership
per
employee

.151*
.643
.613
21.036***

.684
.652
21.345***

.706
.666
17.847***

a

Standardized regression coefficients are reported.
†
p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

Overall, hypothesis 2 is supported by the data. Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of what this relationship looks
like in the data.

Conclusions
The reality of the current competitive environment dictates
that firms must innovate, but they must also make efficient
investments with their resources. R&D expenditures are a traditional tool that companies use in the hope of developing
innovation, but this article demonstrates that innovating is
not solely a function of investing in R&D. In order to become
and remain competitive, companies must innovate and find
ways to use their resources to their maximum potential. One
way they can do this is by making sure the employees are
motivated and committed to the organization. This research
shows support for the argument that they become motivated
and committed to the extent that they participate as owners
in the company.
This study contributes to the existing literature on innovation by testing a moderator on the relationship between R&D
and innovative outputs. Few moderators on this main-effect
relationship have been explored, and future researchers may
wish to consider additional potential moderators. Such

Figure 1. Employee ownership as moderator of the
relationship between R&D intensity and innovative
output
efforts would result in important practical implications for
firms because it would allow them to make better use of
their R&D expenditures.
This study also makes a contribution to the employee
stock ownership literature. Many studies have found a link
between employee ownership and firm financial performance (Long, 1980; Park and Song, 1995; Trebucq, 2004), but
this is the first study that explores it as a determinant of innovative output. This research attempts to show that, by affecting the employees’ motivation and commitment, employee
ownership can advance the innovation agenda of the firm by
acting as a moderator of the relationship between R&D intensity and innovative output. By producing more innovations,
firms are able to create and maintain competitive advantages
that ultimately have a positive impact on firm financial performance.
The results of this study also have some important managerial implications. Managers infrequently have limitless
resources and money they can invest in R&D with the hope
that they will somehow produce innovations. Instead, managers have to determine how to get the most out of their limited investment. One way to increase this input-output efficiency is to create mechanisms that motivate and commit the
employees to their organization. One way to create this motivation and commitment is through company ownership.
Several limitations to this study should be considered.
First, although a growing number of studies argue that the
more patents a firm possesses the more intensive the firm’s
innovative activities may be (Patel and Pavitt, 1987; Frame
and Narin, 1990: Acs, Anselin, and Varga, 2002), the use of
patent data in research does not fully capture other ways in
which a firm may behave innovatively. For example, while
Kuratko, Covin, and Garrett (2009) tie internal corporate venturing—the creation of new business units—to a strategy of
innovation, internal corporate venturing does not necessarily
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presuppose that patents will be among the outcomes of the
venture(s). However, using patent counts has a clear, intuitive
appeal as a measure of a firm’s innovations outputs (Chin et
al., 2009). Future researchers may consider gathering primary
data from the firms themselves to address a more complete
portfolio of innovation within the firm.
Additionally, about 70 percent of the sample was eliminated because those firms did not report 11-k filings to the SEC.
From their own web pages, it is apparent that some of those
firms do, in fact, have employee stock and savings plans, but
this information is not available through public SEC data. This
imposes the additional limitation of whether the sample is
representative and unbiased. Although a statistical analysis
determined that the firms filing 11-k’s were no different from
those that did not file, future research might improve upon
this limitation by collecting primary data on employee stock
ownership from each firm in the sample. Additionally, future
research should consider alternative forms of employee
incentive programs; this could leave to ANOVA testing to
compare which incentive programs lead to the highest levels

of innovation within a firm.
Finally, due to the secondary nature of the data used in this
study, there was no empirical test of the path assumed by the
study; namely, that a firm’s use of an ESOP generates employee innovative behavior, and then that those behaviors generate innovative outcomes for the firm. Indeed, innovation
capabilities of the firm are likely to moderate the latter direct
effect in such a path. Future research may consider gathering
primary data on these important constructs to validate this
path. Such a path, though beyond the scope of the current
study, would be important to future research directions on
this topic.
The intersection of the literatures of innovation and
employee stock ownership appears to be a promising area of
research. This article is one of the first within that intersection, and future research should be encouraged to explore it
further. It has the advantages of causal proximity within its
variables, strong theories available, and important managerial
implications.
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